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Summary 
Cooperative purchasing is becoming more and more common practice. However, many cooperative initiatives end 
prematurely or do not flourish. Important reasons indicated for these problems are directly or indirectly related to 
the unfair division of gains. The purpose of this paper is to indicate causes of unfairness effects in current 
cooperative practices, aiming to enhance cooperative trust and stability. Results incorporate an extensive analysis 
of the most commonly used allocation concept, the Equal Price. We prove that the unfair effects of this concept are 
caused by neglecting a part of the added value of cooperative initiative members. Moreover, we prove that the 
Equal Price allocation value reaches its maximum when the volume of an organisation equals a certain percentage 
of the total volume of a cooperative initiative. So, when using the Equal Price organizations increasing their volume 
past this point will receive less gains. We conclude by emphasizing that it is highly important that cooperative 
members are aware of allocation concept problems. Further research will involve solutions to these problems.  
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Introduction 
Cooperative purchasing initiatives, such as 
purchasing consortia, purchasing cooperatives, 
purchasing groups, buying offices and pooled 
purchasing (Essig, 2000), are becoming more and 
more well-established in the public sector and gaining 
popularity in the private sector (Doucette, 1997; 
Hendrick, 1997; Macie, 1995; Major, 1997; Sickinger, 
1996; Zentes, 2000).  
Economies of scale, reduced double work, 
improved supplier relations, and improved interaction 
are all theoretical advantages related to cooperative 
purchasing. Related disadvantages to cooperative 
purchasing are increased complexity, decreased 
flexibility, loosing control, and having to adapt (see 
Table 1). The advantages should outweigh related 
disadvantages in a large number of cases 
(Aylesworth, 2003; Doucette, 1997; Hendrick, 1997; 
Ireland, 2002; Künneke, 1994; Pye, 1996; Quayle, 
2002; Virolainen, 2003). However, premature endings 
of cooperative initiatives still occur regularly and 
several other cooperative initiatives do not flourish. 
Table 1 – advantages and disadvantages of 
cooperative purchasing. 
Table 1 – Advantages and disadvantages of cooperative purchasing 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Leveraging value-added pricing, service, reliable 
supply, and technology  
 
Reducing transaction costs, workload, risks, and 
tender process time  
 
Sharing purchasing experiences, information, and 
expertise, and learn from each other 
 
Specializing in purchasing typical products 
 
Gaining better access to more resources  
 
Standardizing and harmonizing procedures, 
policies and extending the cooperation to other 
fields 
Having to communicate, decompose tasks, coordinate, 
and monitor partners performance (less responsive) 
 
Having to change specifications, suppliers, et cetera 
 
Dealing with resistance and differences in size, 
commitment, competence, policy, support, et cetera 
 
Loosing (local) existing relations with (small) suppliers 
 
Risking disclosure of sensitive information, fear of 
‘parasites’, and dealing with anti-trust or legal issues 
 
Lacking enough knowledge, competence or having no 
opportunity to purchase cooperatively 
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In purchasing literature many terms are used 
when referred to cooperative purchasing. Despite 
certain patterns in the use of the terms, the 
terminology is not yet fully stabilized (Virolainen, 
2003). In this paper we define cooperative purchasing 
initiatives as: Two or more organisations cooperating 
in one or more steps of the procurement process to 
improve the performance of the participating 
organisations.  
Cooperative purchasing has received relatively 
little attention in purchasing management research. In 
addition, cooperative purchasing research so far has 
focused primarily on inductive explanations of 
practice and qualitative deductive reasoning. The use 
of quantitative deductive reasoning has been limited 
until now (Essig, 1998; Heijboer, 2003).  
The lack of cooperative purchasing research 
attention seems unjustified, with cooperative 
purchasing being more and more well-established. 
Reasons indicated for this positive trend are shifting 
agendas from a short-term view and internal focus to 
a long-term view and external relationship focus 
(Arnold, 1982; Dobler, 1996; Essig, 2000; Leenders, 
1998; Lindner, 1983), e-procurement developments, 
increased competition, and an increased awareness 
and importance of purchasing activities.  
One specific cooperative purchasing issue 
receiving minor research attention is the fair division 
of cooperative gains. To this end we carried out a 
small in-depth survey (see Appendix A). All 
cooperative initiatives in this survey used the Equal 
Price allocation concept, or in other words: all 
organisations pay the same price per item. Also, the 
actual gains in € are on average indicated as being 
the most important reason to purchase cooperatively.  
Already it has been noted that the Equal Price 
can be unfair (Heijboer, 2003). However, most 
initiatives (73%) indicated not being aware of all 
possible unfairness effects when using the Equal 
Price concept. 
It is disturbing to note that important reasons 
indicated for cooperative purchasing problems – 
dealing with differences in size, anti-trust, no 
commitment and ‘fear of parasites’ (see Table 1) - are 
related to gains allocation problems.  
However, a clear understanding of the causes 
and effects of allocation problems does not yet exist. 
Therefore, the main questions in this paper are: What 
are the gain allocation causes and effects of Equal 
Price in cooperative purchasing? And when and how 
do these effects occur?  
To summarize, the purpose of this paper is (1) to 
indicate gain allocation effects in cooperative 
purchasing, (2) to build further (Heijboer, 2003) on 
insights in unfairness effects, aiming to enhance 
cooperative initiative trust and stability, and (3) to 
contribute to the quantitative deductive development 
of purchasing management. 
The model 
To analyze the effects of the Equal Price 
allocation concept (Heijboer, 2003), we model 
cooperative purchasing initiatives by taking into 
account price reduction due to economies of scale. 
As mentioned in the introduction several other issues 
also play a role in the success of establishing and 
managing cooperative initiatives. Here we focus on 
the actual gains in € as this is indicated as being an 
important reason to purchase cooperatively.  
For the price per item p(q) we assume a 
decreasing volume discount is given, with more items 
being purchased. Of course there is a minimum price 
p0, so p(q) is a convex function as is shown in Figure 
1.  
Figure 1 – price per item as a function of the 
quantity 
 
 
 
In addition, we assume the total purchasing 
volume ( )qpq ⋅  to be increasing with the number of 
items being bought (see Figure 2). These 
assumptions hold for many practical situations 
(Dolan, 1987).  
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Figure 2: Total price for buying a quantity of q 
items 
 
 
We refer to this model as a Cooperative 
Purchasing-game or CP-game(N,q,p) (Heijboer, 
2003). N is the number of organisations, q is the 
number of items each organisation wants to purchase 
and p is the price per item. The total gains function 
v(S) of each coalition (cooperative initiative) S is 
defined as the gains it generates by buying items 
together compared to the situation where each of the 
organisations has to buy these items on its own: 
( ) ( ( )) ( )i i i i
i S i S i S
v S q p q q p q
∈ ∈ ∈
= ⋅ − ⋅∑ ∑ ∑        (1) 
Unfairness illustrated 
With the following case we will illustrate the gain 
allocation effects of current practice in cooperative 
purchasing. Consider three organisations purchasing 
cooperatively 60 items. The price p for the items as a 
function of the quantity q that will be ordered is known 
as: 
 ( ) 20 1 1( ) € 959 (1 )i
i i
cp q p c
q q
= ⋅ + = ⋅ +  (2) 
The three organisations use the Equal Price 
allocation concept: the price that can be obtained with 
the volume of the grand coalition N. We define the 
Equal Price concept per organisation i as: 
( )  · ( ( ) - ( ))i i i Nequalprice v q p q p q=        (3) 
This case can be modelled into a CP-game as is 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: CP-game for three organisations 
Coalition S Quantity Price per item Total v(S) 
{1} 
{2} 
{3} 
35 
10 
15 
1 121 
1 262 
1 207 
39 246  
12 625 
18 102 
0 
0 
0 
{1,2} 
{1,3} 
{2,3} 
45 
50 
25 
1 102 
1 095 
1 151 
49 597 
54 741  
28 775  
2 273 
2 607 
1 952 
{1,2,3}=N 60 1 083 64 980 4 993 
 
Now we can analyze the gains each case 
organisation receives when the cooperative initiative 
{1,2,3} uses the Equal Price allocation concept:  
Organisation i gains: qi · (p(qi) - p(qN))  
Organisation 1 gains: 35 · (1.121 – 1.083) = 1.341  
               (largest organisation) 
Organisation 2 gains: 10 · (1.262 – 1.083) = 1.795  
          (smallest organisation) 
Organisation 3 gains: 15 · (1.207 – 1.083) = 1.857 
 
Total gains: 1.341 + 1.795 + 1.857 = 4.993 
A remarkable outcome is that using the Equal 
Price concept leads to a situation where the largest 
organisation receives the smallest part of the total 
gains. The smallest organisation however receives 
the largest part of the total gains.  
The largest organisation could object to this 
allocation, because the largest organisation adds the 
most value to the cooperative initiative. The smallest 
organisation however adds the least value in this 
case, as will be shown in the next section. Such an 
‘unfair’ situation could lead to instability and distrust in 
the cooperative initiative.  
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Added value 
In real life situations organisations can add value 
in several ways to a cooperative. Here, the added 
value, or in other words, the total gains an 
organisation creates for the cooperative initiative, is 
defined as the total gains of the coalition minus the 
value the other organisations can establish without 
organisation i (Borm, 1992): 
 
( ) ( ) { }( )\iM v v N v N i= −         (4) 
 
The added value of an organisation to the 
initiative is equal to its maximum claim. An 
organisation should never receive more gains than 
this maximum claim. Given Mi(v) we can calculate the 
added value of the case organisations: 
 
Organisation i Added Value: Mi(v) = v({1,2,3}) – v({1,2,3} \ {i}) 
 
Organisation 1 Added Value: 4.993 – 1.952 = 3.041        (largest organisation) 
Organisation 2 Added Value: 4.993 – 2.607 = 2.386        (smallest organisation) 
Organisation 3 Added Value: 4.993 – 2.274 = 2.719 
 
We note that the larger the organisation is, the 
more value this organisation adds to the initiative.  
Splitting added value  
To increase the insights of added value in the 
case example, we split this value in three different 
parts: (1) gains for and by an organisation created by 
joining a cooperative initiative (mi: equals the 
minimum  claim of an organisation), (2) gains created  
by an organisation for the other organisations in the 
initiative (ni) and, (3) gains for an organisation created 
by the other organisations in the initiative (oi) 
(Schotanus 2004).  
The added value M2 of case organisation 2 can 
be divided into these three types of gains as is shown 
in Table 3. 
The calculations for the added value of 
organisation 3 can be made in the same way as for 
organisation 2 as is shown in Table 4. 
Table 3: Type of gains of organisation 2 
Gains Description Calculation Total 
mi = gains for and by 2  
 
quantity of {2} ⋅ (price(initiative without 
{2})-price({1,2,3})) 
=10 ⋅ (1.095-1.083) =118 
ni = gains by 2 for N  \ {2} 
 
quantity of {1,3} ⋅ (price(initiative 
without {2})-price({1,2,3})) 
=50 ⋅ (1.095-1.083) =591 
oi = gains for 2 by N  \ {2} quantity of {2} ⋅ (price({2})- 
price({1,3})) 
=10 ⋅ (1.207-1.095) =1.677 
Total maximum claim of 2 =M2 =2.386 
Table 4: Type of gains of organisation 3 
Gains Description Calculation Total 
mi = gains for and by 3 
 
quantity of {3} ⋅ (price({1,2})-
price({1,2,3})) 
=15 ⋅ (1.102-1.083) =287 
ni = gains by 3 for N  \ {3}  
 
quantity of {1,2} ⋅ (price({1,2})-
price({1,2,3})) 
=45 ⋅ (1. 102-1.083) =862 
oi = gains for 3 by N  \ {3} quantity of {3} ⋅ (price({3})- 
price({1,2})) 
=15 ⋅ (1.207-1.102) =1.570 
Total maximum claim of 3 =M3 =2.719 
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For organisation 1 an exception occurs (see 
Table 5), because the volume of this organisation (q2 
= 35) exceeds the combined volume of organisations 
2 and 3 (q2+3 = 25). This influences the calculations 
for mi and oi: instead of price({2,3}), price({1}) should 
be used, as price({1}) is lower than price({2,3}).  
  Table 5: Gains of organisation 1 
Gains Description Calculation Total 
mi = gains for and by 1  quantity of {1} ⋅ (price({1})-price({1,2,3})) 
/ /
/
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
j i ji i
j S i i N j S i
i ji i i
i N j S i
q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q
∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈
 ⋅ − ≤=  ⋅ − >
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
: /
(min ( ), ( ) ( ))j ii iS i S j S i i N
q p q p q p q∈ ∈ ∈
 = ⋅ −  ∑ ∑  
=35 ⋅ (1.121-1.083) =1.341 
ni = gains by 1 for N  \ {1}  
 
quantity of {2,3} ⋅ (price (initiative without 1)-
price({1,2,3})) 
/ /
( ( ) ( ))j j j
j S i j S i j S
q p q p q
∈ ∈ ∈
= ⋅ −∑ ∑ ∑  
=25 ⋅ (1.151-1.083) =1.700 
oi = gains for 1 by N  \ {1}  
 
quantity of {1} ⋅ (price({1})- price({1})) 
/ /
/
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( )) 0 ( ) ( )
j ji i i
j S i j S i
ji i i i
j S i
q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q
∈ ∈
∈
 ⋅ − ≤=  ⋅ − = >
∑ ∑
∑
 
: /
max ( ( ) ( )),0ji iS i S j S i
q p q p q
∈ ∈
 = ⋅ −  ∑  
=35 ⋅ (1.121-1.121) =0 
Total maximum claim of 1 =M1 =3.041 
 
Equal price neglects added value partly 
It is interesting to note that the Equal Price 
concept can be rewritten as follows:  
Hence ni (= the gains by organisation i for N \ {i}) 
is completely neglected, causing the Equal Price 
concept to be unfair in several situations where 
organisations differ significantly in size. 
 ( )
/
/
/ / /
( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( )) 0 (
i i i i
i N
i ji i i
i N j S i
i ji i i
i N j S i
j j i ji i i
j S i j S i i N j S i
ii i
i N
equalprice v q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q
∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈
= ⋅ −
 ⋅ − ≤=  ⋅ − >
⋅ + − − ≤
= ⋅ − +
∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
/
: :/ /
) ( )
(min ( ), ( ) ( )) max ( ( ) ( )),0
 
j i
j S i
j i ji i i iS i S S i Sj S i i N j S i
i i
p q
q p q p q p q q p q p q
m o
∈
∈ ∈∈ ∈ ∈
 >
   = ⋅ − + ⋅ −      
= +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
        (5) 
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For example, in our case we have shown that the 
largest organisation can receive the  smallest  part  of  
the gains. This is caused by the missing ni: 
 
 
Organisation i Equal Price: equalpricei(v) = mi + oi 
Organisation i Added Value: Mi(v) = mi + oi + ni 
 
Organisation 1 Equal Price: m1 + o1 = 1.341            (largest organisation) 
Organisation 2 Equal Price: m2 + o2 = 1.795           (smallest organisation) 
Organisation 3 Equal Price: m3 + o3 = 1.857 
 
Organisation 1 Added Value: m1 + o1 + n1 = 1.341 + 1.700 = 3.041 
Organisation 1 Added Value: m2 + o2 + n 2 = 1.795 + 591 = 2.386 
Organisation 1 Added Value: m3 + o3 + n 3 = 1.857 + 862 = 2.719 
 
Behaviour of added value and equal 
price 
In our model there are three disadvantages to the 
Equal Price concept which apply especially to large 
members. First, as ni is always increasing with more  
items being purchased by organisation i (see Figure 
3), it becomes less attractive for larger cooperative 
members to use the Equal Price concept. After all, ni 
is not incorporated in this concept, and the larger the 
value of ni, the more these members are put at a 
disadvantage.  
Figure 3: n2 and different quantities of q2 while q1+3 = 50 is constant 
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The second disadvantage is caused for the first 
part by oi becoming 0 after a certain point (see Figure 
4). This point is independent of the price structure, the 
number of organisations, and the division of the 
volumes of these organisations. The point were oi 
becomes 0 is always reached when the volume of 
organisation i equals exactly 50% of the total volume 
of the initiative. In such a case a large organisation i 
using the Equal Price concept receives just the value 
of (mi + oi = mi + 0 = ) mi.  
Thirdly, past the point where the volume of large 
organisation i becomes higher than a certain 
percentage of the total cooperative volume, mi will 
even become smaller by an increasing volume of 
organisation i (see Figure 5). At least past this point 
the total Equal Price gains always decrease, as oi is 
already 0, even if this organisation increases its 
volume through the initiative. This point is 
independent of the number of organisations, and the 
division of the volumes of these organisations. 
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Figure 4: o2 and different quantities of q2 while q1+3 = 50 is constant 
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Figure 5: m2 and different quantities of q2 while q1+3 = 50 is constant 
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Figure 6 illustrates the combined effects on the 
three different types of gains when the number of 
needed items changes for organisation 2. The total 
number of needed items for organisations 1 and 3 
remains the same in this figure. We see in figure 6 the 
value of M2 increasing with an increasing value of q2. 
At a certain point, the Equal Price value for 
organisation 2 reaches its maximum value, even 
though Mi and the total gains of the cooperative 
initiative increase.   
Figure 6: type of gains for organisation 2 with different quantities of q2 while q1+3 = 50 is constant 
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equalpricei + ni = Mi 
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Properties of fairness  
To assess the fairness of allocation methods in 
general we can use several properties of fairness 
from cooperative game theory relevant to cooperative 
initiatives. Game theory is a mathematical research 
field that deals with multilateral decision making. Each 
decision maker (player) has his own interests and has 
a number of possible actions open to him. By his 
actions, each player affects the outcomes for the 
other players. In cooperative game theory it is 
assumed that gains can be made when all players 
cooperate. One of the problems that are addressed in 
this theory is how to divide these gains in a fair way 
among all players. The properties of fairness we use 
in this paper are the following (Albizuri, 2002; 
Driessen, 1991; Friedman, 1999; Heijboer, 2003): 
 
(1) EFF: efficiency. All gains are allocated back to 
the organisations: ( ) ( )∑
∈
=
Ni
i Nvvf  
(2) SYM: symmetry. If for two organisations i and j 
can be interchanged without changing any v(S) 
then fi(v) = fj(v). It means that equal organisations 
should get equal pay-offs. 
(3) DUM: dummy. If {}( ) ( ) {}( )ivSviSv =−∪  for 
all {}iNS \⊂  then fi(v) = v({i}). It means that 
an organisation, which does not contribute 
anything, should not get anything. 
(4) STA: stability. EFF is satisfied and for all 
coalitions S it holds that ( ) ( )Svvf
Si
i ≥∑
∈
. It 
means that for each organisation the pay-off of 
cooperation in the grand coalition is equal or 
higher than the pay-off of working alone or in any 
other sub coalition. Note that STA implies that 
organisation i cannot receive a larger pay-off 
than Mi(v) or a smaller pay-off than the mi(v). 
(5) ADD: additivity. For two games v and w with 
solutions f(v) and f(w) it holds that  
f(v + w) = f(v) + f(w). A cooperative initiative could 
be used for multiple (types of) items at the same 
time. Each item could be treated as a separate 
game with a separate gain allocation. The gains 
from all items could also be added up and be 
allocated at once. It seems fair that when the 
same allocation concept would be used for each 
item separately or for all of them together the 
total amount allocated to each organisation 
should be the same. This is just another way of 
saying that ADD has to hold. 
(6) FR: fair ranking. If for two organisations i and j qi 
≥ qj then fi (v) ≥ fj (v). It means that FR is satisfied 
if an organisation with an equal or larger quantity 
of items to be purchased through a cooperative 
initiative receives an equal or larger share of the 
gains. 
(7) MON: monotonicity. If for one organisation i qi’ ≥ 
qi then fi’ (v) ≥ fi (v). Satisfying this property 
means that if the quantity of items to be 
purchased by one organisation stays equal or 
becomes larger than in a former situation, this 
organisation should receive an equal or larger 
amount of gains. In other words, fi is 
nondecreasing in qi 
Properties of fairness and equal price 
Table 7 gives an overview of which properties of 
fairness are satisfied in general for CP-games for the 
Equal Price concept. Proofs have been omitted here.  
Table 7: properties of fairness for the Equal Price 
concept (9 = satisfied, 8 = not satisfied) 
Equal Price properties of fairness  Satisfied in general 
Efficiency 9 
Symmetry 9 
Dummy 9 
Stability 9 
Additivity 8 
Fair ranking 8 
Monotonicity 8 
 
Table 7 shows that using the Equal Price concept 
can lead to situations where the largest organisation 
receives the smallest part of the total gains (FR 
property). Also, the situation could occur that an 
organisation increases its purchases through the 
cooperative initiative, but in return receives a smaller 
amount of the gains (MON property). This could slow 
down potential growth and harm the stability of the 
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cooperative initiative. ADD is not satisfied as well, 
making the Equal Price concept less suitable for 
multiple item cooperative initiatives. 
The Equal Price problems occur when 
organisations in a cooperative initiative differ in size. 
The more they differ, the higher the unfair effects will 
be. The problematic effects usually decrease, with 
more organisations in a cooperative initiative. In other 
words, the effects are levelled out to a certain extent.  
Conclusions 
In this paper we build further on the link between 
cooperative initiatives and cooperative game theory. 
We prove that the Equal Price concept consequently 
ignores an important part of the added value of 
organisations, causing this concept to be unfair for 
large members of cooperative initiatives.  
When the volume of an organisation becomes a 
certain percentage of the total volume of a 
cooperative initiative, the Equal Price value for this 
organisation reaches always its maximum. So, when 
using the Equal Price concept organisations increasing 
its volume past this point will receive fewer gains, even 
though its added value and the total gains of the 
cooperative initiative increase. For these larger 
organisations it becomes less attractive to cooperate in 
this initiative. They could even leave the initiative or join 
another one. Other solutions are using another allocation 
concept or finding new members. In our further research 
we will deal with solutions to these problems.  
To conclude, when organisations are unequal in 
size and use the Equal Price concept, it is highly 
important that this is an intentional choice and that the 
cooperative members are aware that problems like 
Fair Ranking, and Monotonicity could arise when 
dividing the gains1. 
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Appendix A - properties of the studied cooperative purchasing initiatives 
From 2003 to 2004 we carried out several semi-open structured interviews with purchasing managers within 
organisations active in cooperative purchasing. We studied 15 Dutch public cooperative purchasing initiatives.  
 
Sector Research method Number of organisations in initiative and relative size in purchasing volume 
Health 1 interview in large organisation 1 large organisation, 5 medium organisations, several small organisations 
Health 1 interview in large organisation 2 large organisations, 2 small organisations 
Health 1 interview in large organisation 2 large and 1 small organisation 
Health 1 interview in large organisation 6 large organisations 
Local government  1 interview in large organisation 1 large organisation, several small organisations 
Local government 4 interviews in large, medium, and small organisations 
1 large organisation, 2 medium organisations, 1 small 
organisation 
Local government  4 interviews in large and medium organisations 
1 large organisation, 2 medium organisations, 9 small 
organisations 
Local government 1 interview in large organisation 1 large and 3 medium organisations 
Local government  1 interview in medium organisation 2 medium and 1 small organisation 
Local government  1 interview in medium organisation  2 medium and several small organisations 
Police  1 interview in large organisation 27 large, medium, and small organisations 
Police, local government 1 interview in medium organisation 1 large organisation, 1 medium organisation 
Tax department, ministry 1 interview in large organisation 1 large organisation, 1 medium organisation 
Tax department, ministry, local 
government 1 interview in large organisation Several large, medium, and small organisations 
University 1 interview in medium organisation 9 large and medium organisations 
15 cooperative initiatives in 
total 21 interviews  
 
